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The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains 
are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the 
parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically 
important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests 
that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of 
English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.  
 
1. Pain in English 
English has at least two distinct ways to report on physical pain. There is a 
predicative locution: ‘My back hurts’; ‘My back is painful’. The surface grammar 
is that of attributing a state to a body part. There is also a locative locution: ‘There 
is a pain in my back’; ‘I have a pain in my back’. On the level of surface grammar, 
this locution postulates that there is a thing, a pain, which can be possessed by a 
 
 
subject, and asserts that it is spatially located within a body part where the location 
is usually signalled by the prepositional phrase ‘in NP (noun phrase)’.1  
The predicative locution is relatively neutral on what pains actually are. The 
locative form, by contrast, seems more committal: it treats pains as things that can 
be quantified over and can have spatial locations. Focus on this locution has driven 
a number of philosophical debates.  
Bodily theories of pain claim that pains are, in some important sense, things 
which are located in body parts. For example, many theories claim that pain 
experience (in part or in whole) represents bodily damage (Armstrong 1962; Cutter 
and Tye 2011; Bain 2013). Damage is also the sort of thing that is located in our 
bodies, which means that these kinds of representationalism have a straightforward 
way to account for the locative form of pain reports. Conversely, the locative form 
has been used in arguments against (e.g.) adverbial theories of pain, which have to 
treat the locative form as a paraphrase (see Tye 1984). Adverbial theories are 
thought of as not squaring well with our ordinary conception of pain. Appealing to 
the locative form, Tye notes (1984: 319): ‘[w]e certainly speak as if pains are felt 
objects which are located in sundry parts of our bodies’.  
More broadly, the debate about the locative form is relevant to debates about 
the perceptual status of pain itself (Hyman 2003; Aydede 2005a; Bain 2007). The 
                                                 
1 In English, we can also appeal to experiential predicates like ‘feel’ and ‘experience’ to talk 
about pain: ‘I feel pain’. In this case, the surface grammar appears to attribute a state to the 
subject of the experience, while sentences like ‘I feel a pain in my leg’ have features of the 
locative locution. However, as Fischer et al. (2015) emphasize, ‘feels’ talk can introduce 
additional implicatures; we thus focus on locutions which avoid the phrase.  
 
 
locative form, at least on the surface, would commit pains to being the objects of 
sensation, rather than just properties of objects like body parts. Aydede (2013) uses 
numerous examples of the locative form to suggest that something ‘in our ordinary 
conception favours an understanding of pains as if they were the objects of our 
perception’. And indeed, the following two sentences seem to be at least 
syntactically parallel:  
I feel a pain in my leg.  
I see a tree in the garden.  
Whether this is in conflict with transparency theses that motivate intentionalism 
remains a contested question (see Aydede 2019 for a recent overview and 
argument).   
Conversely, the locative form has raised persistent puzzles. Consider the 
following inference, from Block (1983: 517):  
The pain is in my fingertip. 
The fingertip is in my mouth.  
Therefore, the pain is in my mouth.  
Something has gone wrong. Block himself suggests that the ‘in’ of pain must 
signify something other than spatial enclosure. Noordhof (2001, 2002) agrees, 
noting numerous parallel cases of non-spatial ‘in’. Tye disagrees, noting that there 
are multiple spatial uses of ‘in’ (2002) and (2005) that some of these uses set up 
intensional contexts where substitution fails. Bain (2007) argues that there is no 
straightforward route from problematic arguments like Block’s to a denial of an 
underlying metaphysical view on which pains are located. By contrast, Hyman 
 
 
(2003) and Noordhof (2005) both suggest that the puzzle can be solved by 
translating the locative form without remainder into the predicative, which in turn 
undermines the philosophical significance of the locative locution. More recently, 
Reuter, Sienhold, and Sytsma (2019) appeal to pragmatic implicatures to explain 
the puzzle and give empirical evidence that these implicatures are cancellable. They 
take this to support a bodily view of pain.   
In each case, while nominally about pain, the debate has turned on the 
interpretation of various English-language pain reports. Many English prepositions, 
including the preposition ‘in’, are opaque and overloaded with meaning, raising the 
possibility that these puzzles are an artefact of English grammar. 
Cross-linguistic research has the potential to show which features of pain 
are artefacts of the English language, and which are universal and might in turn be 
taken to be philosophically significant (Wierzbicka 2012). Mandarin Chinese is the 
world’s most widely spoken native tongue (Wang and Sun 2015: 578), and so 
makes an excellent test case.  
 
2. Pain in Mandarin 
The English word ‘pain’ is translated into Mandarin as either tòng (痛) or téngtòng 
(疼痛). The former is used either as a noun or as a verb, whereas the latter is only 
used as a noun. There is also the word téng (疼), which is predominantly used as a 
verb. Mandarin speakers from northern China tend to use the word téng (疼), 
whereas those from southern China tend to use the word tòng (痛).  
 
 
At a first pass, the standard way to discuss pain in Mandarin closely parallels 
the predicative locution in English:  
我背疼 
Wǒ    bèi     téng  
1SG   back  hurt 
‘My back hurts.’  
我的背很痛 
wǒ   de    bèi   hěn   tòng 
1SG  LIG back very ache  
‘My back is very sore.’  
我背不舒服 
wǒ   bèi     bù    shūfú 
1SG  back  not  comfortable  
‘My back isn’t comfortable.’2  
                                                 
2 Mandarin also has a way to discuss pain that closely parallels the English locution ‘I feel 
pain’:  
我感觉痛 
wǒ    gǎnjué   tòng 
1SG   feel       ache 
‘I feel pain.’ 
我感觉背痛 
wǒ    gǎnjué  bèi     tòng 
1SG    feel     back   ache 
‘I feel that my back aches.’ 
However, one cannot directly render English sentences like ‘I feel a pain’ or ‘I feel pain in 
my back’ in Mandarin.  
 
 
On the other hand, there appears to be no straightforward equivalent of the locative 
form. Indeed, it would seem that pain reports in Mandarin cannot have many of the 
features of the locative form.  
The locative form for reporting on physical pain in English has the 
following four features:  
(1)  It uses a prepositional phrase; most importantly, it can take 
the preposition ‘in’ as in ‘in my back’ – the use of the 
preposition ‘in’ signals the body part where pain is located; 
(2)  Pain is countable – one can say ‘a pain’;  
(3)  It permits an existential construction as in ‘THERE IS a 
pain’.  
(4)  It permits a possessive construction as in ‘I HAVE a pain 
in my back’.3  
The surface grammar of the locative locution suggests that pain is analogous to 
physical objects whose location in space can be specified with the prepositional 
phrase ‘in NP’. Pains are also treated as countable objects. We can use the 
existential construction, e.g. ‘There is a pen’, and the possessive construction, e.g. 
‘I have books’, to talk about physical objects; it appears that parallel talk about pain 
is also licenced.   
                                                 
3 In Mandarin, the same lexicon yǒu, which is polysemous, is used to mean either existence, i.e. 
‘there is’, or possession, i.e. ‘have’. The difference is traced to a difference in the relevant 
syntactic properties: ‘The “have” use of yǒu takes two arguments in a relational type of clause 
(POSSESSOR-NP yǒu POSSESSED-NP), whereas existential yǒu takes only one, typically 
postverbal, argument’ (Chappell 2002: 285).  
 
 
All four features of the locative locution of pain attribution that are present 
in English are impermissible in Mandarin. Indeed, corresponding sentences with 
the same surface grammar are not just odd but (in most cases) flatly ungrammatical:  
(1) Mandarin does not have a similar construction to the prepositional phrase ‘in 
NP’ in English to report the location of pain. The location of pain is usually 
specified by the noun phrase in the predicative locution which also acts as the 
subject of the sentence: 
我的肚子疼 
Wǒ   de    dùzi         téng 
1SG  LIG  stomach  hurt 
‘My stomach hurts.’ 
However, Mandarin does use the postposition lǐ, similar in meaning to the English 
prepositions ‘in’ or ‘inside’, in specifying the location of concrete physical objects:                   
我包里有一本书 
wǒ     bāo-li   yǒu        yīběn     shū 
 1SG  bag-in  there.is  one:CL  book 
‘There is a book in my bag.’ 
In colloquial Mandarin, lǐ is sometimes used in the particular phrase xīn-li tòng to 
mean that one is in emotional pain (though it is more common to leave out the word 
lǐ):  
我心里痛 
wǒ    xīn-li       tòng 
1SG  heart-in  ache  
 
 
‘My heart aches.’ 
Nevertheless, lǐ is not usually used in a postpositional phrase in Mandarin to signal 
the body part affected by physical pain.  
(2) In Mandarin, pain is not countable. One cannot say ‘a pain’:  
*一个疼痛 
*yīgè    téngtòng 
 one:CL pain 
‘a pain’ 
In contrast, one can say ‘a wound’:  
一个伤口 
yīgè      shāngkǒu 
one:CL  wound 
‘a wound’ 
In Mandarin, sensations in general are not countable, whereas things like wounds 
are. While English permits phrases such as ‘an itch’, ‘a tickle’, etc., direct 
renderings of these phrases are ungrammatical in Mandarin.  
(3) While Mandarin has an equivalent to ‘there is’ in English (i.e. yǒu), it seems 
that such a construction cannot be used in the context of reporting sensations and 
their locations. Mandarin does not permit this existential construction with respect 
to pain:  
*我耳朵后面有痛 
*wǒ  ěrduo  hòumiàn  yǒu         tòng 
 1SG   ear     behind     there.is   ache  
 
 
‘There is an ache behind my ear.’  
In contrast, the existential construction can be used in Mandarin with respect to 
concrete physical objects:  
我包里有笔 
wǒ    bāo-li    yǒu        bǐ 
1SG  bag-in  there.is  pen 
‘There is a pen in my bag./There are pens in my bag.’  
 (4) Mandarin does not permit the possessive construction with respect to pain: 
*我有痛 
*wǒ   yǒu   tòng 
1SG  have  pain 
‘I have pain.’ 
In contrast, the possessive construction can be used in Mandarin with respect to 
concrete physical objects:  
我有笔  
wǒ    yǒu   bǐ 
1SG  have  pen 
‘I have a pen./I have pens.’  
The locative use of pain reports is defined by the four features outlined 
above, i.e. (1) ‘pain’ can take the prepositional phrase ‘in NP’; (2) ‘pain’ is 
countable; (3) ‘pain’ can take the existential construction ‘There is NP’; and (4) 
‘pain’ can take the possessive construction ‘NP have NP’. Given that all these four 
features are impermissible or absent in Mandarin, it is reasonable to conclude that 
 
 
Mandarin does not have the locative locution for reporting on physical pain that is 
employed by English.  
 
3. More complex cases 
Mandarin is a complex language, and some locutions are more difficult to analyse. 
However, closer examination reveals that none support a locative reading.  
First, Mandarin does use postpositional phrases to indicate the location of 
pain.  For instance, one can say: 
我的眼睛后面疼 
wǒ    de    yǎnjīng  hòumiàn  téng 
1SG  LIG     eye       behind     hurt 
‘Behind my eye hurts.’ 
However, closer inspection reveals that postpositions are primarily used when the 
pained body part has no name in the language. Thus understood, the locution is still 
predicative, with the location information serving to pick out an otherwise un-
named body part of which hurting is predicated.  
 Second, the following phrase in Mandarin might appear to suggest that 
pain is countable: 
一阵痛 
yīzhèn               tòng 
a.short.period   pain  
‘pain that is sudden and lasts for a short period’ 
 
 
The word yīzhèn seems to be a fixed phrase, referring to a short duration. The word 
zhèn as used in ‘yīzhèn tòng’ should not be treated as a classifier. For instance, it 
sounds odd to say: 
*两阵痛 
*liǎng      zhèn             tòng 
  two   short.period   pain 
 ‘two (sudden, short) pains’  
So, even if Mandarin has the phrase yīzhèn tòng, it does not mean that pain is 
countable or is treated as something that is quantifiable. Furthermore, the phrase 
yīzhèn seems to be a fixed phrase that functions like an adverb in the following 
construction: 
我肚子一阵痛 
wǒ       dùzi          yīzhèn          tòng 
1SG  stomach  a.short.period  pain  
‘My stomach hurt suddenly and for a short period.’4 
Third, Mandarin does have the following locution which can appear to be 
an instance of the possessive construction where pain seems to be quantifiable:  
                                                 
4  We acknowledge that this grammatical analysis of yīzhèn tòng (一阵痛 ) is somewhat 
contentious. An anonymous reviewer has suggested that the word zhèn (阵) in yīzhèn is a 
meaningful item and should be taken as a measure word rather than an individual classifier 
like gè (个). We have argued that yīzhèn as used in ‘yīzhèn tòng’ is a fixed phrase and zhèn 
in this context should not be treated as a classifier of any sort. But even on this alternative 
analysis of yīzhèn tòng, pain is uncountable in Mandarin as nouns for ‘pain’, namely, téngtòng 




wǒ   yǒudiǎn  tòng 
1SG    a.bit       hurt  
‘I hurt a bit.’  
However, the phrase yǒudiǎn (有点) in this context functions as an adverb. This 
adverb can also be used to describe the intensities of sensations and emotions in 
general.   
The phrase yǒudiǎn (有点) sometimes gets treated as the conjunction of a 
verb, i.e. yǒu, plus a quantifier, i.e. diǎn, to mean either ‘have a bit of’ or ‘there is 
a bit (of something)’. For instance, one can say the following:  
锅里有点米饭  
guō-li   yǒu       diǎn  mǐfàn  
pot-in  there.is  a.bit   rice  
‘There is a bit of rice in the pot.’ 
Equally, one can say ‘There is a lot of rice’ with the phrase ‘yǒu quantifier’, i.e. yǒu 
hěnduō in this case. In the case of describing the intensity of pain, yǒudiǎn is a fixed 
phrase which functions as an adverb to modify the verb tòng. One cannot say the 
following: 
*我有很多痛 
*wǒ    yǒu  hěnduō  tòng 
 1SG   have  a.lot       hurt 
‘I have a lot of pain.’ 
 
 
The above utterance is ungrammatical because Mandarin does not permit the 
possessive construction, i.e. ‘NP yǒu NP’, with respect to pain or sensations in 
general. One can of course convey the meaning of ‘I have a lot of pain’ in Mandarin 
with the predicative locution: 
我很痛 
wǒ    hěn   tòng 
1SG  very  hurt 
‘I hurt a lot.’ 
 In sum, though Mandarin has a variety of more complex locutions 
regarding pain, none give evidence for a locative reading of pain.   
 
4. Conclusion 
There is considerable evidence that Mandarin Chinese lacks anything like the 
locative use of pain. Assuming, plausibly, that the experience of physical pain itself 
is a cross-cultural universal, this suggests that the surface grammar of the locative 
form is philosophically misleading, and should not be relied upon to support 
philosophical theses.  
What is the philosophical upshot of this result?  Most at risk, we believe, are 
bodily views of pain which identify pains with bodily states such as tissue damage 
(Massin 2017; Reuter, Sienhold and Sytsma 2019).  Also at risk are versions of 
representationalism on which pains are objects located in the body – for example, 
because pain experiences in fact represent tissue damage (Cutter 2017). Note that 
there is something of an ambiguity here in the way that representationalist views 
 
 
are presented. As Tye (2005: 101) notes, 
The term ‘pain,’ in one usage, applies to the experience; in another, it 
applies to the quality represented insofar as (and only insofar as) it is 
within the content of a pain experience.  
Insofar as the represented content is cashed out as a located bodily quality, 
representationalism is threatened.  
Conversely, representationalist views on which the represented object is the 
body, or a relationship between a subject and their body (as in Noordhof (2005)) 
should be unaffected. These stick more closely to the predicative locution in 
English, which is directly paralleled in Mandarin. Similarly, imperative views such 
as Klein's (2015), on which the location of the pain is fundamentally determined by 
the pained body part, should be unaffected.  
Furthermore, as we have noted, not only does Mandarin lack the ‘in NP’ 
construction to talk about pain, features (2)-(4), which treat pain as a countable 
object over which one can quantify, are equally poorly supported in Mandarin. As 
a result, this may well have broader consequences for the debate over perceptual 
theories of pain.  
This may re-open the door to pure predicative or adverbial theories of pain. 
These have been criticized precisely because they appear to be in conflict with the 
locative form of pain expressions in English (Tye 1984). If those expressions are 
language-specific, however, such constraints are less strong than they might appear.  
Our discussion also invites further empirical investigations into cross-
cultural and cross-linguistic differences in people’s conceptions of pain. A 
 
 
deflationary reading of the above would suggest that the puzzles about pain are due 
to quirks of the surface grammar of English; these quirks have misled English-
speaking philosophers about the universal concept of pain. A more cautious reading 
might suggest that the linguistic differences represent differences in the concept of 
pain among different populations; there is independent experimental evidence that 
English speakers have a bodily conception of pain (Reuter and Sytsma 2018). 
Adjudicating between the two possibilities requires further empirical research, 
some of which has already begun (Kim et al. 2017). 
Either way, our analysis is an example of how cross-linguistic work may 
help sharpen and clarify philosophical disputes which have been conducted largely 
in a single Indo-European language.5 Here, we note that our argument does not rely 
on the claim that the locative locutions for pain in English are untranslatable into 
Mandarin.6 Nor do we intend to advance dubious claims about differences in pain 
experience between English and Mandarin speakers. The point is instead meta-
philosophical. Much of the literature on pain has focused on the specific 
grammatical features that are associated with the locative form of pain reports in 
                                                 
5 In that sense it is in the tradition of Machery et al (2004). However, we note that cross-cultural 
experimental philosophy has itself been criticised for lack of attention to linguistic differences, 
e.g. Lam (2010).  
6 Trivially so. Locative locutions for pain in English are translatable into Mandarin. However, 
the translated sentences would usually have a surface grammar parallel to that of the 
predicative locution in English, e.g. ‘My back hurts’. So, the translated sentences would not 




English. The fact that these features do not and cannot occur in Mandarin should 
cast serious doubt upon that strategy. 
Careful discussion of English locutions has an important place in analytic 
philosophy, of course. We do not wish to disparage such work. Yet cross-linguistic 
evidence can be an important check to make sure that we are focusing on features 
of the world, rather than artefacts of our native tongue.7  
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NP: noun phrase  
1SG: first person singular  
CL: classifier  
LIG: marker of ligature in dependency relations – de 
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